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ABSTRACT
One of the major corollaries of the post-war fertility boom and decline 
is that two-child families became common across Europe after the 
1970s. Despite the general agreement on the convergence of fertility 
trends, there is still little understanding of how this change took place 
in a comparative perspective of Western and Eastern Europe, which 
at that time were characterised by Cold War tensions of different 
ideological regimes. This study addresses this aspect by focusing on 
individual decisions around childbearing, child-rearing and family 
size. Based on 104 oral histories from Switzerland and Ukraine, this 
study illuminates that the urban setting provided parents with a 
similar set of constraints and opportunities, which eventually resulted 
in strikingly similar perceptions of the costs of childrearing on two 
sides of the Iron Curtain. Individuals’ motives to postpone first birth in 
Switzerland and second birth in Ukraine rested on a similar aspiration 
to invest in the well-being of children by ensuring material security 
for the family. This aim was increasingly achieved through female 
labour-force participation and adoption of modern contraception – 
the pill in Switzerland and abortion in Ukraine. While the timing of 
returning to the labour market and the share of women working after 
entering parenthood might have varied across the two contexts, a 
good mother became increasingly defined in both contexts in terms 
of providing emotionally and financially for her children. Although 
the introduction of modern birth control methods allowed couples 
to plan family size more carefully, it also made Swiss and Ukrainian 
women increasingly carry the major costs and actual burden of birth 
control. Altogether, this study challenges the common assumption 
around the persistence of strikingly different demographic realities in 
post-war Western and Eastern Europe by uncovering the mechanisms 
behind the stabilisation of family size around the two-child family 
ideal.
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Introduction
The last decade has seen an increasing interest in the study of the post-war fertility boom 
and decline in Europe (Caldwell, 2001; Caldwell & Schindlmayr, 2003; Esping-Andersen & 
Billari, 2015; Oinonen, 2008; Van Bavel & Reher, 2013; Wilson, 2011). One of the major corol-
laries of these demographic trends is the stabilisation of family size around two-child families 
after the 1970s (Caldwell & Schindlmayr, 2003; Frejka, 2008; Goldstein, Lutz, & Testa, 2003; 
Oinonen, 2008; Sobotka & Beaujouan, 2014; Wilson, 2011). While there is general agreement 
on the convergence of fertility trends across Europe, our knowledge is very limited on how 
these similar demographic changes took place under different ideological regimes and 
socio-economic conditions of the Cold War era in Western and Eastern Europe. This is prob-
ably due to the fact that Cold War tensions laid the foundation for studying social life and 
hence demographic realities in capitalist and communist societies as contrasting to each 
other.
Studies of fertility decline in Western Europe have largely focused on uncovering the 
reasons behind the baby boom and the subsequent baby bust in the post-war decades 
(Sandström, 2014; Van Bavel & Reher, 2013). The transition from the baby boom to the baby 
bust and the associated decrease in family size is often explained by the rise of individual-
isation and individual self-realisation (Lesthaeghe, 1995; Van de Kaa, 1987, 2002) and the 
‘sexual revolution’ that led to nearly universal acceptance of modern contraceptives, most 
notably the birth control pill (Cook, 2004). In the East, however, the absence of a baby boom 
is linked to the significant loss of the male population, while the rapid post-war fertility 
decline and decreasing family size are associated with universal female employment and 
the emergence of the so-called women’s double burden (Blum, 2003, 2004; Lapidus, 1978; 
Vishnevskij, 2006; Zakharov, 2008). Moreover, the re-legalisation of abortion is also thought 
to have accelerated this decline.
Indeed, the paths of the post-war fertility declines in Western and Eastern Europe were 
surrounded by distinctive demographic trends and accelerated by seemingly different polit-
ical and institutional constraints. If taken for granted, this conclusion also invites the assump-
tion that individuals must have decided differently about childbearing, childrearing and 
regulation of family size in the West than they did in the East. However, recent studies of 
everyday lives under capitalism and communism offer a different narrative. They have shown 
that individual realities on both sides of the Iron Curtain were, in fact, not that different and 
often surrounded by similar struggles to meet certain living standards and private life aspi-
rations (Carter, 1997; Gerchuk, 2000; Reid, 2002, 2009; Reid & Crowley, 2000; Zakharova, 
2013). More importantly, the convergence in fertility rates in Western and Eastern Europe 
around the two-child family ideal also suggests that some similar processes were happening 
on the micro-level. While these historical and demographic accounts indicate potential sim-
ilarities behind the post-war changes in individuals’ reproductive decisions on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain, individuals’ accounts on changing family size have rarely been studied 
through a comparative perspective of Western and Eastern Europe.
This study is the first attempt to look beyond the divergence narrative of post-war demo-
graphic trends by focusing on individual decisions around childbearing, child-rearing and 
family size. We consider that decision-making around family size reflects individuals’ per-
ceptions of the costs of childrearing and contraception (Alter, 1992; Szreter, 1996). Following 
this theoretical perspective, this study aims to explore what women and men perceived as 
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their parental responsibilities in the context of changing living standards and how they 
decided and tried to limit their family size in the post-war decades, from around 1950 to 
1975.
Based on 104 oral history accounts of mothers and fathers from Switzerland and Ukraine, 
our findings illuminate that despite divergent political and economic contexts, the urban 
setting provided Swiss and Ukrainian parents with a somewhat similar set of constraints and 
opportunities. These constraints and opportunities eventually resulted in strikingly similar 
perceptions of the costs of childrearing and contraception, which led individuals to reduce 
their family size. In this respect, this study challenges the assumption that individuals decided 
differently about their family and reproductive lives on the two sides of the Iron Curtain and, 
as we illustrate below, the study also reveals the importance of adopting a micro-level anal-
ysis of individual behaviours to go beyond dominant macro-level narratives in demography 
– many of which have prevailed since the Cold War – in order to explain the present-day 
realities.
Theoretical Background
Theoretically, we depart from the cost-benefit framework developed by the demographer 
George Alter (1992). According to this perspective, parents weigh the costs and benefits of 
having an additional child while considering the costs of contraception. This economic con-
cept has been enhanced to integrate the ‘perceived relative costs of childrearing’, as Simon 
Szreter (1996) defines it. He stresses that it is not only the economic and emotional costs of 
having children that influence individuals’ fertility decisions, but also larger sociocultural, 
ideological, institutional and political factors that shape parental responsibilities and ideas 
about family size. Importantly, this does not imply that each of these factors is the universal 
driver of any fertility decline, but rather that these political, cultural, ideological and social 
forces and events must be considered at the level of local communities that experience 
changes that are specifically relevant for them (Hilevych, 2016b; Kreager & Bochow, 2017; 
Rusterholz, 2017; Szreter, 2015). In addition, we do not consider couples who assess the 
‘perceived relative costs of childrearing’ as homogeneous ‘black boxes’; rather, we believe 
that this appraisal may differ between wives and husbands (Greene & Biddlecom, 2000; 
Janssens, 2007; Mackinnon, 1995; Praz, 2007; Watkins, 1993). The way in which parents per-
ceive the costs of childrearing is intrinsically linked to the way they understand the gendered 
meaning of parental responsibilities (Pooley, 2013; Rusterholz, 2015a, 2017).
In Western Europe, the changing costs of having children are often argued to be the major 
precondition of fertility decline. Historians have generally analysed the period 1955–1975 
as one of transition from the traditional bourgeois family model to an individualistic family. 
The former is characterised by asymmetrical gender roles of parenthood, while the latter is 
defined as more egalitarian in terms of spousal relationships and more modern because 
individuals have become emancipated from traditional norms (Lesthaeghe, 1995; Van de 
Kaa, 1987, 2002). In this framework, motivation to limit family size changed from an altruistic 
investment in child quality to self-realisation, as children have become a means of this ‘self-re-
alisation’. Recently, however, the idea of two successive motives has been challenged by Van 
Bavel (2010), who suggests that the explanations given for the Second Demographic 
Transition (SDT) are very similar to the ones given contemporaneously for the low and 
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declining fertility in the interwar period, i.e. secularisation, individualisation, leisure and 
rising consumerism.
On the contrary, in the historiography of the Soviet fertility decline, reproductive behav-
iour change is often linked to socio-economic hardships and overall population changes 
taking place throughout the twentieth century, such as the First and Second World Wars, 
and the mass repression and famines during Stalinism (Blum, 2003, 2004; Vishnevskij, 2006; 
Zakharov, 2008). In this context, the post-war decades inherited the outcomes of these 
demographic changes, most significantly the shortage of male population. Alongside these 
population changes, the legalisation of abortion, universal secondary education and female 
labour-force participation are argued to have reinforced the fertility decline in the region 
(Blum, 2003, 2004; Vishnevskij, 2006) through the appearance of women’s double burden 
(Lapidus, 1978). As such, the double burden, alongside with the rather limited availability 
of grandparental support, especially in the urban context, and the overall nuclearisation of 
urban households in the course of Soviet family politics, significantly increased the perceived 
costs of childcare (Hilevych, 2016a; 2016b).
Another dispute dividing the scholars of Western and Eastern fertility decline is the debate 
surrounding gendered responsibilities of birth control and the methods used to limit family 
size. There has been a long-standing assumption that women, because they carry the burden 
of pregnancy, have been the driving force behind fertility limitation practises (Gittins, 1982). 
Recent oral history studies on Western and Eastern Europe, however, have challenged and 
complicated this narrative by showing how responsibility for birth control could be gendered 
depending on the cultural, social and institutional context (Claro, 2016; Fisher, 2006; Hilevych, 
2015; Rusterholz, 2015b; Szreter & Fisher, 2010). Moreover, it has been argued that a shift in 
contraceptive methods took place in the second half of the twentieth century; traditional 
methods, such as withdrawal, which was deemed to be mainly a man’s responsibility, are 
said to have been replaced by modern and primarily women-controlled methods of birth 
control (Cook, 2004), such as the contraceptive pill in post-war Western Europe and abortion 
in Eastern Europe. What, however, still remains unclear in the context of the comparison 
between West and East is whether the costs of contraception and traditional methods, which 
were still commonly used in the post-war decades, remained men’s responsibility or along-
side modern methods also became women’s responsibility, and how this was reflected, if at 
all, in the overall changing costs of children.
Data and Methodology
This study is based on 104 biographical interviews with men and women belonging to the 
lower middle and working classes living in an urban environment, who entered parenthood 
between 1955 and 1975.1 Among these 104 interviews, 56 interviews were with parents 
from Ukraine and 48 with parents from Switzerland. Originally, these interviews were col-
lected as parts of two different projects: one on parenthood decisions and fertility changes 
in Switzerland, and the other on family relationships and reproductive decision-making 
during the fertility decline in Soviet Ukraine. To meet the aims of this study, we analysed the 
two samples by following the same methodology, which was possible because both inter-
view guides contained questions on parental responsibilities and family limitation decisions. 
All the interviews were transcribed verbatim, anonymised and thematically analysed sepa-
rately for the two contexts: Atlas.ti qualitative software was used to perform the analysis on 
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the Ukrainian interviews and NVivo was used for the Swiss interviews. We developed the 
same coding techniques and similar coding structures, which allowed us to follow the same 
guidelines when performing a thematic analysis (Saldaña, 2012). Every interview was first 
analysed independently, after which it was compared with other interviews to identify con-
trasts, overlaps and similarities. Detailed descriptions of the samples, considerations of oral 
history methodology and the precautions that this type of data required have been devel-
oped in greater depth in our previous works (Hilevych, 2016b; Rusterholz, 2017).
Importantly, focusing on the same social classes in the urban environment allows us to 
have comparable data, because the socio-economic transformations experienced in 
Switzerland and Ukraine during the 1960s primarily affected the working class and the lower 
strata of the middle class. Oral history is particularly meaningful for studying a period of 
transition where different behaviours coexisted and were challenged (Thompson, 2000). 
More importantly, as our analysis shows, this method allows for the identification of nego-
tiations and compromises elaborated by those who witnessed these changes, and, more 
importantly, the way they dealt with constraints and dominant norms, which typically would 
be obscured in aggregate data. For this reason, these individual accounts should not be 
treated as representative of the entire populations of Switzerland and Ukraine, but inter-
preted though the depth of the insight they provide into individuals’ experiences of post-war 
fertility decline in two strikingly different urban environments. This knowledge, in turn, 
should further help to identify the macro-level indicators underlying the convergence of 
fertility trends on the macro level.
Context
Between 1955 and 1975, the majority of Western European countries witnessed the transition 
from the baby boom to the baby bust. In Switzerland, the decrease in fertility after the baby 
boom was rapid. Considering the evolution of the total fertility rate since the turn of the 
twentieth century, one can observe a constant decrease in fertility until its lowest point of 
1.8 children per woman before the Second World War in 1937. Fertility then recovered to 
2.62 children per woman in 1945, before falling to 2.3 in 1955. The second baby boom was 
then perceptible, with a peak of 2.68 children per woman in 1964, followed by a dramatic 
drop to 1.5 by 1976 (Bureau fédéral de statistique, 1977). This period between 1955 and 1970 
was also significant for economic growth, and scholars frequently refer to it as the ‘Golden 
Age’. Subsequently, an increase in the purchase of consumer goods, such as cars, washing 
machines, televisions, radios and refrigerators, whose strong demand led to a reduction in 
prices, seems to have been one of the main features of this period. The budget share that 
Swiss families allocated to food, housing and clothing, which had been important in previous 
decades, decreased, leaving them with more disposable income to spend on other needs 
(Leimgruber & Fischer, 1999; Skenderovic & Spati, 2012; Tanner, 1994, 1998). Alongside this 
economic situation, the institutional context also changed: secondary education became 
democratised; the traditional sexual division of labour was strongly encouraged by the wel-
fare system and by social norms, as conveyed in newspapers and magazines; and women 
gained the right to vote in 1971. All of these conditions were conducive to family limitation 
(Rusterholz, 2017). The sale of contraceptives was legally allowed, though the advertisement 
of such products was prohibited. The contraceptive pill became available on prescription 
on the Swiss market in 1961. From 1946, abortion was allowed on medical grounds: when 
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the health of the mother was in danger and after two practitioners had to agree on the 
necessity of the procedure.
In contrast, in Ukraine, fertility only started to decline in the 1910s, but the speed of the 
decline was rapid. Similarly to other Eastern Bloc countries, Ukraine did not experience a 
baby boom, and by 1960 the fertility rate in Ukraine had declined to a below-replacement 
level of 2.05 (Steshenko, 2010). This period is often defined as a latent depopulation 
(Vishnevskij, 2006). Furthermore, the Soviet-style post-war modernisation, most significantly 
the rural–urban migration and new social housing (khrushchevka), clearly promoted the 
nuclear model of Soviet families, with the emphasis on the couple rather than on the 
extended family (Hilevych, 2016b). Additionally, the production and consumption of various 
electronic appliances, such as refrigerators, washing machines and televisions, increased 
significantly in the post-war decades (Hanson, 2014). Although the Soviet regime argued 
for abandoning bourgeois consumerist practices, consumption became a ‘crucial concern 
in the Soviet response to the Cold War’ as Khrushchev’s regime recognised the need to 
increase the quantity, quality and range of consumer goods in order to improve living stand-
ards, particularly those of nuclear families (Hanson, 2014; Lapidus, 1978; Reid, 2002, 2009). 
The particularity of Soviet consumer culture was that while shortages were visible in all areas 
of life, from food and clothing to electronics and housing, they were still possible to acquire. 
Moreover, the state was constantly increasing average income while keeping prices stable 
and relatively low, which contributed to the overall perception of improving living standards 
(Hanson, 2014; Reid, 2009). Finally, the post-war decades were significant for the re-legali-
sation of abortion (1955), which was available on demand to any woman and was frequently 
practised as a birth control method (Popov & David, 1999). Besides abortion, however, men 
and women were limited to methods with extensive failure rates, such as withdrawal, vaginal 
douches, the rhythm method or Soviet-made condoms (Hilevych & Sato, 2018), which were 
known for their poor quality (Popov & David, 1999; Remennick, 1991).
Results
Individual motives for limiting family size: increasing costs of children
Both Swiss and Ukrainian parents used their children’s well-being as the main motive behind 
their aspirations to limit family size. Our analysis shows the existence of a common belief 
that families with more than two or three children would not be able to achieve proper 
well-being for their children. The accounts of Anna from Ukraine, a mother of two who was 
a factory worker for her entire life, and Andrea from Switzerland, a mother of three who 
worked as a nurse before marriage and became a housewife afterwards, illustrate this 
element:
Anna:  I wanted to have three children but my husband did not want it. He did not want our 
children to become beggars, you know. We wanted to raise our children properly and 
not in the way we grew up ourselves…and had hard childhoods, you know. So, we knew 
that we had to provide our children with everything and that’s why we did not want to 
have more children.2
Andrea:  I had three children and it was enough for me. Because if we wanted to give 
them a good upbringing, so that they could study if they wanted to, having a 
large family, especially in an urban setting, was too difficult. Thus, having three 
children was enough.3
THE HISTORY OF THE FAMILY  413
Despite being in different employment situations after marriage, Anna and Andrea hold 
similar views on the hardship associated with having a large family in an urban setting. 
Moreover, they both referred to children’s well-being as a central motive for limiting family 
size. Similarly to these accounts, the notion of ‘providing parents’, those who gave their 
children a good upbringing and secured their well-being, was also central in other inform-
ants’ narratives and often entailed specific tasks on the part of the parents. This child-centred 
view and related gendered parental responsibilities needs to be understood in line with 
informants’ own childhood experiences, which reinforced a common perception of increas-
ing childrearing costs, both material and social, in the post-war decades.
The informants often presented schooling and its related material costs as essential to 
their children’s upbringing. Schooling was seen not as optional, but as an integral part of 
overall children’s well-being, as the account of the Swiss informant Bernard vividly illustrates. 
After completing his apprenticeship as a postman, Bernard married a working-class woman 
in 1966 and they had two children. To improve his family’s material situation, he began a 
training programme as a policeman while he continued working as a postman. Bernard 
explained that having two children allowed him to fulfil his parental responsibility of pro-
viding his children with a good education:
In my time, the average family size was around two. I mean, there were families with four or 
three children but hardly ever more than that. That was like this because we wanted to rear them 
properly, to provide them with a good upbringing, to give them the opportunity to study, to 
give them a good situation.4
In a similar fashion, Maksim, who first worked as a taxi driver and later, after pursuing 
higher education at the technical institute, as a factory engineer in Ukraine, linked his deci-
sion to stop having children after the second child to his aspirations of securing adequate 
material well-being for his children. Even though in the Soviet context the state provided 
parents with free schooling and often even supported basic childcare expenses such as 
school uniforms and books, Maxim was nevertheless convinced that having more than two 
children would have resulted in material hardship for the family:
Interviewer:  Why did you decide to have children no more children after the second one?
Maksim:  I was an engineer and my salary was not high, around 110 rubels. And she worked 
as a nanny and earned around 80 rubels per month. And we had two children 
already. Then, the older one went to school. So, it did not seem possible to us. 
[…] One thing is that you need to get some everyday things for them and also 
some basic things for the school.5
In both contexts, the standards of providing a good upbringing implied much more 
financial investment than just schooling. Childcare costs often encompassed many extras, 
such as additional private (study or bedroom) space for them in the apartment, toys and 
leisure activities, which were often linked to the urban way of life and the set of opportunities 
and constraints it provided. A Swiss informant, Lotti, wife of an educator and mother of two 
children, recalled that she wanted to have more than two children, but the material con-
straints associated with the urban way of life, specifically the housing situation, prevented 
her from following this aspiration:
When I was a teenager, I wanted more than two children. But when we moved to Lausanne 
and to a flat, I thought that if we were able to handle things with two children it was already 
well done. After our second child was born, I did not want another one. After the second child, 
I took the pill. I did it because of the size of our flat and because of our jobs and also because 
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we realised that life was becoming more and more difficult. Two children to make ends meet, 
to pull through was enough.6
Another Swiss informant, Sylvie, explained how her desire to offer her children an enjoy-
able life, comparably good with that of other children growing up in the neighbourhood, 
motivated her to limit the size of her own family to two children:
Interviewer:  Why do you have two children?
Sylvie: Because they say that having only one child is not healthy, but for me having three 
children was too much. It was too expensive, especially since we wanted them to have a 
nice and enjoyable life.
Interviewer:  And what does it mean to you to have a nice and enjoyable life?
Sylvie: (laughing) To always have something to eat on the table, be able to go on holiday and that 
they could have a bike too, and that they could have what other children had (laughing).
Interviewer:  Did you think that if you had more than two children it would have been difficult 
to give them what other children had?
Sylvie: Yes, we did. More obviously, it would have prevented them from having what they wanted, 
from having a good upbringing.7
Among the Swiss informants, the decision to stop childbearing and a two-child family 
size were often justified by the desire for a certain level of well-being for the already-born 
children and for the family as a whole. For example, Véronique referred to the size of her 
family as not only the ‘norm’ at that time, but also as an opportunity to raise the material 
level of her family’s welfare. She first worked as a laboratory assistant, and after marrying a 
graphic designer in 1964, had her first child in 1966. She then quit her job to take care of the 
first and second child, who was born a few years later, in 1969: 
Véronique:  You know that the more children you have, the more expensive it becomes, 
especially in Switzerland. You could not allow yourself to say that the third child 
meant giving up on a washing machine and the fourth on holiday. At that time, 
in reality it was like that, that having more than two children meant giving up 
on a washing machine, or car, or on whatever else!8
Among the Ukrainian informants, material costs were also associated with an urban way 
of life and specifically the housing situation, which seemed to affect how some of the inform-
ants redefined their childbearing aspirations during marital life. Martha, a mother of two, 
acknowledged: My husband and I thought that if we had a nice big flat, we would have had 
many children. But we had only one room and there was no space to even accommodate them.9 
Similarly, Maria, a working mother, together with her husband who worked in the military, 
could only afford the basic things necessary to secure the desired living standard for her 
children. In her view, material constraints explained why she only had one child. At the same 
time, Maria’s standard of parenthood was high, as she first tried to invest in her child’s leisure 
and personal development, which were more easily achieved in urban areas at that time in 
Ukraine.
I wanted our child to be able to do different things. She [Maria’s daughter] even went to take 
some circus lessons. I wanted to give her all that I could and I knew that she had a talent for it. 10
Beyond the longing for certain material investments in children’s well-being and devel-
opment, an important role was also played by other social costs, such as the time and emo-
tional energy spent on children. More importantly, these social costs were also pronounced 
in the context of submitting to certain childcare standards, such as being an attentive and 
well-rested parent, which were often of concern to mothers. Especially prevalent among the 
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Swiss informants, these motherhood standards were often presented as the main reason 
for spacing or stopping childbearing. Martine married an engineer in 1955, and became a 
mother of two children, born in 1960 and 1963. She was trained as a lab technician and 
became a housewife after her first child was born. She presented her emotional and time-re-
lated investment in the children as the main reason behind her decisions to space the two 
births:
Martine:  We postponed the second birth and we thought three years between them 
was great. Well, we waited and we were careful.
Interviewer:  Why did you want to wait for the second?
Martine:  It was for taking care of the first one properly before… That we did not have 
both in consecutive years because I always felt sorry for people who had twins. 
And having one right after the other is even worse than twins. At least twins 
have the same rhythm. One after the other is awful, you are constantly trying to 
take care of the kids, it’s very tiring, time consuming, it’s much too exhausting.11
The Ukrainian informants also connected the social costs of childcare to their decision to 
space births. However, the notion of parental time and emotional investment in children 
was intertwined with the long-term perspective of parental assistance for children, which 
often continued after schooling and sometimes extended into marital life (Hilevych, 2016b). 
Kateryna, who was born in 1942, married a woodworker in 1966, worked in a factory for her 
entire life and in 1967 gave birth to her first and only child, explained this view:
Kateryna:  Once you have a child, you are responsible for this child. You support and guide it 
through life. You should give education to this child. You should give everything. 
As long as you have the possibilities, you should provide everything for your 
children. But if you don’t have any more, then they should try to do it themselves. 
But it is your child, and as a parent you should always help them.12
These aspirations to encourage children’s material and social well-being through educa-
tional involvement, leisure, adequate housing and parental time were closely linked to the 
childhood experiences and hardships that the informants themselves went through during 
their childhoods, most commonly due to financial constraints in the case of Switzerland and 
the war in the case of Ukraine. As a result, and as many of the aforementioned accounts 
show, informants were aware of the high costs of raising children. Indeed, in the period of 
post-war economic transition in the West, where the standard of living improved and access 
to consumer goods were democratised, acquiring these goods was a sign of social status 
and thus a way to ensure one’s reputation in the neighbourhood. In this respect, the emer-
gence of the notion of parental investment in children’s development often derived from 
personal childhood experiences. As the experience of the Swiss informant Marie-Jeanne, 
born in 1944, vividly illustrates, an effort was made by her parents, particularly her mother, 
to allow her to receive a post-primary education: My mother worked in order to pay for me to 
go to secondary school because I was a very good student. She worked really hard. She did house-
work for others so as to pay for me to go to a private secondary school. In 1964, Marie-Jeanne 
married a coachbuilder; they had two daughters. Even though she faced financial difficulties 
during her matrimonial life, she was committed to guaranteeing her daughters not only 
secondary education, which was vital to her, but also a certain level of well-being through 
access to leisure and other education activities. As such, Marie-Jeanne emphasised the dif-
ference she tried to make in her children’s lives, compared to what she experienced herself 
as a child:
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I always tried not to penalise them vis-à-vis other children. It means that they took ski lessons. 
Jeanne had dance lessons and Claire music classes. I would love them to play the piano. I always 
tried not to discriminate them against other children. They had ice skates because they loved 
ice hockey.13
Similarly, among the Ukrainian informants, aspirations to provide children with more than 
just the basic needs of food, clothing and schooling were also anchored in increasing access 
to certain goods and possibilities. During the Khrushchev era, these aspirations emerged 
out of changing social-economic standards in the private sphere of life that were especially 
prominent in urban areas and seemed to serve as the motive for limiting family size among 
the Ukrainian informants. As such, in both contexts, at the intersection of these personal 
childhood experiences and later parenthood realities emerged a more unified idea and 
standard about parental responsibilities and the way parents should ensure decent well-be-
ing for their children. These parental responsibilities were also accompanied by a certain 
degree of social pressure that parents would often experience if they did not submit to this 
standard. Importantly, the urban setting allowed for this pressure to be exercised on an 
everyday basis, as parents could more easily observe the lives of other families. The notion 
of good upbringing implied similar perceived costs of having children among the Swiss and 
Ukrainian informants. That said, these similarities need be understood in the context of the 
different pathways for achieving desired family size and well-being in Switzerland and 
Ukraine, which were often discussed through the ideas and decisions regarding timing of 
parenthood and female employment, as we discuss in the following section.
Achieving desired family size and well-being
It is an accepted fact that the timing of first and second births followed different trajectories 
in Western and Eastern Europe in the post-war decades, and our informants were no excep-
tions to these trends. However, we observe similar motives that persuaded some Swiss 
couples to postpone the first birth and some Soviet Ukrainian couples to postpone the 
second birth. Among the most common reasons to postpone entrance into parenthood 
invoked by the Swiss informants were the aspiration to settle down properly and to secure 
living standards through saving some money and buying furniture. It was also notable that 
the desire to delay the first birth arose mainly among individuals who were new to the urban 
environment and had fewer financial resources or actual support from their families. For 
example, Carlo, a skilled worker who was married to a dressmaker in 1960, and had three 
children, born in 1962, 1965 and 1968, with the last being unplanned, explained that the 
two-year gap between the marriage and the birth of the first child was connected to his 
desire to become more financially secure:
Interviewer:  Was it a conscious decision to wait a bit before having your first child?
Carlo:  Yes, it was, two years at least. Only to be able to settle, to see things coming and to have 
some savings.14
Among the Ukrainian informants, aspirations to achieve a certain level of material well-be-
ing were also linked to postponement behaviour; however, this was not in the context of 
the first birth but rather the second. The aspiration to postpone the second rather than first 
birth was largely connected to the fact that in the Soviet context men and women often did 
not intend to secure their entire living situation prior to marriage and first birth and many 
continued to live with and rely on their parents in these matters, at least with regard to the 
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first birth (Hilevych, 2016b). However, the second birth was seen as a point by which parents 
themselves should have secured a living standard for the family (Hilevych, 2016a), which in 
the Swiss context could be observed around the entrance into parenthood (Rusterholz, 
2017). The account of Zoya, who was born in 1938 in Ukraine, had her two children at the 
age of 28 and 35, respectively and worked as a technologist for most of her life, illustrates 
that she decided to have her second child after starting to feel more materially secure in life.
In 1972, my parents moved out [to another city] and we had their apartment for ourselves. 
Everything seemed to become stable and I thought that I was ready to have a second child. It 
felt like the right time.15
The aspirations to secure material well-being of the family were often achieved through 
a dual-earned model. Despite the differences in the legal regulation of female labour-force 
participation in the two contexts – which was compulsory in Soviet Ukraine and thus often 
universal, while in Switzerland it was optional yet often practised by middle and low-income 
families – the majority of women worked until the birth of a child and hence contributed to 
acquiring the basic needs for the arrival of the child. In addition, many women had and tried 
to return to the labour market soon after the first birth in order to maintain the family’s 
income and hence desired well-being. For this reason, the Ukrainian informants often tried 
to postpone having a second child by at least five years (for more on this topic see (Hilevych, 
2016a)). Furthermore, the informants were especially cautious about pregnancies following 
their second birth, which most frequently resulted in abortions, sometimes even without 
the husband’s consent (see also (Hilevych, 2015)). The experience of Varvara, who worked 
for her entire life in a factory, married a worker in 1957 and had two children, born in 1958 
and 1963, illuminates her decision to have an abortion after falling pregnant again after her 
second child in order to continue working:
Interviewer:  You said that you got pregnant soon after your son (second child) again. And 
did you tell your husband? Did you discuss this pregnancy?
Varvara:  Well, I did tell him that I was pregnant and that I wanted to continue working. 
That was it. It was not even a matter to be discussed further. I did not plan to 
have three children.16
Similarly, some Swiss families in precarious financial situations also considered female 
employment to make a significant contribution to the family’s overall income and standard 
of living, which often meant deciding to stop childbearing and return to the labour market 
soon after birth. Silvio and Francesca are an illustrative example of this behaviour. Both born 
in Italy in 1938 and 1940, respectively, they moved to Switzerland for work in order to accu-
mulate some savings with the intention of returning to Italy. Eventually, however, they stayed 
in Switzerland and had their children there. Silvio explained that with an additional child, 
his wife would not have been able to maintain her participation in the labour market, an 
essential monetary contribution to the family’s well-being:
Silvio:  If she could have stayed at home, if I had an adequate salary to allow her to stay at home, 
three or four children would have been lovely. But after two, we thought that it was 
enough.
Interviewer:  And you, Madam, did you ever consider stopping working?
Francesca:  Well, when I was pregnant with the second child there were many colleagues of 
the same age who wanted to work part-time but unfortunately our boss never 
agreed. Then, it was that if we changed our jobs we would have lost almost 1000 
Swiss francs because elsewhere it was really paid less. I mean that it made me 
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think about it. Well, I have always worked full-time and honestly I don’t know 
how I handled everything and kept the situation going for so long. My children 
have grown up and I am so lucky they are not drug addicts. We could have been 
at work during the day and sometimes also during the evenings. When I was at 
home, I was at home with them. But it was hard, let’s be honest.
Silvio:  You know, after we started to have a nice standard of living: being able to earn enough 
money for a four-room apartment, to have a car…We got used to it… to go every year 
to Italy to see our family.17
Francesca’s account also reveals the contradictory feelings she experienced when going 
back to the labour market. While positively acknowledging her contribution to the family’s 
well-being, she nevertheless felt guilty for not spending enough time with her children. As 
such, she seems to have internalised the contemporaneous injunction of motherly presence 
spread by the Swiss media and formulated by psychologists, associating maternal absence 
with negative consequences in children’s development (Rusterholz, 2017).
Overall, the Swiss informants’ justification for delaying entrance into parenthood and the 
Ukrainian informants’ rationalisation for delaying the second birth were motivated by the 
will to secure family well-being in the two different contexts. Female employment was a 
crucial means for achieving it. Importantly, whether women returned to the labour market 
after giving birth or became housewives, they continued to presume and carry most of the 
responsibilities around childcare. The role that they played in securing family well-being, 
both in terms of material and emotional costs, as well as prior to and after childbearing, 
seems to have been important for increasing the costs of children and hence aspirations to 
decrease family size in the two structurally different contexts. As such, through the timing 
of parenthood and female employment, the costs of children became highly interlinked 
with the costs of contraception, especially for women, as we show in the next section.
Costs of contraception
The availability of different modern birth control methods – the pill in Switzerland and 
abortion in Ukraine – certainly implies that there were different contraceptive practices 
between the two contexts. However, when looking at this issue from the perspective of 
responsibilities, the private realities of women, at least, look more similar than different. In 
Switzerland, women accepted that they carried the responsibility for both traditional and 
modern methods, and gynaecologists often played a crucial role in informing women of 
these possibilities (Rusterholz, 2015b).18 In Ukraine, while men continued to be perceived 
as responsible for birth control, it was often women who were responsible for the final 
decision on whether to keep the pregnancy or terminate it through abortion (Hilevych, 
2015). As oral history accounts illustrate, in the post-war decades, Swiss and Ukrainian 
women, either openly or in a more nuanced way, started to carry the actual costs and burden 
of birth control, which could be seen as a latent factor in increasing the perceived costs of 
childrearing, especially among women.
The Swiss informant Monique, who was trained at a business school, married a post office 
employee and became a mother of two children, explains the reason why women had to 
be primarily responsible for birth control methods:
Monique:  I asked my gynaecologist for birth control.
Interviewer:  And did you discuss it with your husband?
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Monique:  My husband was not interested in this topic [birth control]. If I decided some-
thing, he would just follow me. It was not like today. At that time, it was a female 
responsibility to deal with fertility. Men did not know what to do about that...19 
Importantly, methods of birth control differed according to the motivation to space or 
stop births among the Swiss couples. When a couple was trying to space births, natural 
methods of birth control appeared to be an agreeable solution, since they did not interfere 
with the spontaneity of the sexual act. However, when a couple wanted to stop having 
children, modern methods of birth control such as the pill and sterilisation were used, and 
women were the initiators of these methods, even when it was the husband who underwent 
sterilisation. For instance, Suzanne, born in 1930, used different methods of birth control 
according to her motivation to space or stop births. At the beginning of her marital life, she 
used the temperature method to delay the first pregnancy. Once she had her first child, since 
she was afraid to become pregnant again straight away, the couple used condoms alongside 
spermicide jelly. They stopped this method when they wanted a second child. Suzanne 
thought the method was efficient, but she found herself pregnant for a third time. Suzanne 
explained that the third child was an ‘accident’. She then decided to ask her doctor for an 
efficient method of birth control:
Interviewer:  And after the third child, how did you do to avoid becoming pregnant again?
Suzanne:  My husband underwent a vasectomy. We discussed it because I did not want 
an additional child and since we had the same general practitioner I told the 
doctor, ‘Could you please tell my husband to undergo a sterilisation?’ This is how 
it went. My husband agreed.
In this context, the Swiss female informants who used traditional methods such as periodic 
abstinence also saw birth control as their responsibility. Women would calculate fertile days 
and avoided having sexual intercourse during that time. These women reported that their 
husbands ‘became angry’ when they refused sexual intercourse, suggesting that negotiations 
regarding sex did not always end in agreement. A way to avoid these tensions, as explained 
by these women, was to go to bed late in the evening when the husband was already asleep. 
This form of abstinence was presented as something imposed by the wife. Some women 
decided to use modern methods on their own without informing their husbands, and others 
decided which method they would use before informing their husbands.
Although some Swiss couples viewed birth control as a shared responsibility, even then 
women still took the initiative to ensure the effectiveness of the method used. These women 
reported having taught their husbands how to use the withdrawal method because they 
had acquired knowledge of the subject from books and discussions with friends and family. 
For instance, Sophie, a mother of three children, explained to her husband how to avoid 
pregnancy by practising withdrawal because she did not want a ‘full house of children’. She 
stated that she also imposed abstinence on her husband: I had to prevent intercourse. 
Otherwise, I would have got pregnant all the time.20
Unlike in Switzerland, where women were able to openly exercise their agency in birth 
control decisions in order to achieve the desired family size, in Ukraine women often pre-
sumed ignorance in birth control. As couples typically practised withdrawal, which was 
perceived as men’s responsibility, and was a method that frequently failed, women did how-
ever exercise their agency to seek abortions, often in order to continue working (Hilevych, 
2015). This was especially prevalent when pregnancies following the first birth were unin-
tended. In that case, some women would seek an abortion, sometimes consciously avoiding 
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informing their husbands, as shown by the example of Zinaida. Born in 1939, she worked as 
an accountant and after her first and only child she had an abortion: I told him that I would 
not give birth. That’s it.21
By means of abortion, women were also trying to loosen the double burden of combining 
work and motherhood, and, as a result, were the ones who eventually decided on final family 
size. Varvara, who was mentioned earlier, illuminates this practice: He (Varvara’s husband) 
was like…whether we had five or one child, he would not care […] He knew that anyway I will 
be the one taking care of them.22 It often happened that women were reluctant to discuss 
abortion with their husbands or other family members, such as mothers-in-law, because 
they knew that the latter might be in favour of keeping the child. At the same time, as the 
childcare responsibilities would still be on women while they also had to work, women were 
primarily interested in ensuring that the family size was affordable for the family. Despite 
the differences in childrearing strategies and methods of birth control, Swiss and Ukrainian 
women carried the primary burden of ensuring the effectiveness of birth control because 
it was they, not their husbands, who were primarily concerned about limiting family size 
and doing so effectively.
Conclusions and discussion
In the context of post-war changes surrounded by both increasing possibilities to improve 
family living standards and widening access to modern birth control, especially in urban 
areas, smaller family size seems to have become a reflection of material opportunities and 
individual aspiration towards family well-being. The opportunities and constraints associated 
with the urban way of life were especially crucial in the individuals’ definition of parental 
responsibilities. Many found the post-war opportunities to increase family well-being were 
drastically different from what they had experienced in their own childhood. At the same 
time, the urban way of life allowed observing the lives of others more closely, which facili-
tated many informants to adopt and feel pressured to submit to a new standard of parent-
hood. The new ideal of ‘providing parents’ entailed a child-centred view on parenting and 
became a central element in limiting family size on both sides of the Iron Curtain.
To achieve the new parenthood standard, the informants used a postponement strategy 
for the first birth in Switzerland and for the second birth in Ukraine. This strategy was driven 
by the same perception of the increasing costs of childrearing, while female employment, 
either before entering parenthood as in Switzerland or over the entire life course as in 
Ukraine, became a crucial means to secure family well-being. Our informants, who were the 
mothers of the ‘baby-boom’ generation, facilitated the adoption of a nearly universal female 
labour-force participation in the post-war decades by participating in the labour market to 
comply with the norm of being a providing parent.
In the West, this change coincided with the idea of being a full-time housewife as increas-
ingly contested and, as a result, the issue of the bored housewife gained attention in the 
Western mass media (Rusterholz, 2017). By the end of the 1960s, although being a (part-time)
working mother was motivated by different reasons in Switzerland than in Ukraine, it became 
an accepted model of motherhood in both countries. Being a good mother became synon-
ymous with a providing and nurturing mother who contributed to the emotional stability 
and physical development of her child. Parents used their children’s well-being as the main 
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motive for their birth control behaviours, and the healthy development of a child became 
an injunction for reducing family size for many parents by the end of the 1960s.
The increase in female labour participation should also be understood together with the 
introduction of modern birth control methods – the pill in Switzerland and abortion in 
Ukraine – that additionally stressed the primary role of women in family size decision. Women 
started to carry the responsibility of ensuring the effectiveness of birth control methods, be 
it for the traditional and male method in Switzerland or for the modern methods in Ukraine. 
Women who tried to be providing mothers both financially and emotionally had a strong 
incentive to take responsibility or to initiate the use of efficient methods of birth control. 
Small families with two or three children in Switzerland and one or two children in Ukraine 
emerged as the best way to achieve the children’s well-being. In the Western European 
contexts, this finding nuances the idea that the baby bust resulted from the will of self-re-
alisation instead of an altruistic investment in children. In the Soviet context, this aspiration 
goes along with the Soviet prioritisation of nuclear families during the Cold War decades 
(Hilevych, 2016b). In the broader context of the post-war universalisation of female secondary 
educational attainment and increase in female labour-force participation, these similar aspi-
rations to primarily invest in the child’s well-being certainly resulted in a changing perception 
on the part of women about investing in children and, consequently, in smaller family sizes, 
as previous studies also indicate (Van Bavel, 2014).
Finally, our findings illuminate that whereas the longing for smaller families and decreas-
ing family size were achieved through different reproductive practices on two sides of the 
Iron Curtain, the constraints, possibilities and rationales surrounding parenthood decision 
in the urban setting were strikingly comparable. The growing and strengthening financial 
and emotional investment in children combined with the increasing costs of contraception 
placed on women could explain the stabilisation of the ideal family size around two children. 
These similarities could well reflect the fact that the Cold War competition indeed seemed 
to unify the view on private life and what family well-being entailed. Altogether, this study 
challenges the common assumption around the persistence of strikingly different demo-
graphic realities in Western and Eastern Europe by uncovering the mechanisms behind the 
stabilisation of family size around two-child family ideal in the post-war Europe.
Notes
1.  In the context of Ukraine, we refer to civil servants and working class people as representing 
the lower middle and working classes. This selection therefore excludes scientific and party 
elite, who can be considered upper-middle or upper class in the Soviet context.
2.  Anne, Lviv, Ukraine, 2012.
3.  Andrea, Fribourg, Switzerland, 2011.
4.  Bernard, Lausanne, Switzerland, 2011.
5.  Maksim, Kharkiv, Ukraine, 2014.
6.  Lotti, Lausanne, Switzerland, 2011.
7.  Sylvie, Fribourg, Switzerland, 2011.
8.  Véronique, Lausanne, Switzerland, 2011.
9.  Martha, Lviv, Ukraine, 2014.
10.  Maria, Kharkiv, Ukraine, 2014.
11.  Martine, Lausanne, Switzerland, 2011.
12.  Kateryna, Lviv, Ukraine, 2013.
13.  Marie-Jeanne, Fribourg, 2011.
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14.  Carlo, Fribourg, Switzerland, 2011.
15.  Zoya, Kharkiv, Ukraine, 2012.
16.  Varvara, Lviv, Ukraine, 2013.
17.  Silvio and Francesca, Fribourg, Switzerland, 2011.
18.  In Switzerland, there were differences in the gynaecologists’ attitudes and hence access to 
modern methods between Catholic and Protestant cantons (Rusterholz, 2015b). However, 
women’s responsibilities for both traditional and modern methods of birth control were similar.
19.  Monique, Lausanne, Switzerland, 2011.
20.  Sophie, Fribourg, Switzerland, 2011.
21.  Zinaida, Kharkiv, Ukraine, 2012.
22.  Varvara, Lviv, Ukraine, 2013.
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